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STuDBNT NOTE S
CONFLICT OF LAWS AND JURISDICTION FOR DIVORCE-
SEPARATION OF THE MARITAL STATUS.*
For the purpose of this discussion, the following hypothetical case
Is assumed:
H and W were married in State X, where they lived as husband
and wife for several years. H left W in state X and went to state Y
where he established a bona fide domicile. He then sued for a divorce
on the ground of desertion having service on his wife by publication.
H obtained a default decree in state Y and later married W, number
two. After living with W Number Two for several years, he died leav-
ing real property in state X, state Y, and state Z. W Number Two had
dower granted her in property in state Y and later W Number One
brought suit to have dower granted her in the real property in state
X. The court in state X granted W Number One dower holding that H
was In fault in his separation from W Number One and that the divorce
In state Y was invalid. Subsequently, -W Number One sues to have
dower allotted to her in the real property located in state Z, W Number
Two being made a defendant and appearing in the action.
The question to be discussed herein is which of these two women
Is entitled to the real property in state Z.
The solution offered in this note is based on the decision of United
States Supreme Court in Haddock v. Haddock.' The right to dower in
the property in state Z depends on which of these two women state Z
recognizes as the wife of H at his death.
The solution is:
The marriage relation is composed of a number of legal incidents.
Certain of these legal incidents followed H to state Y and state Y had
jurisdiction of so many of these legal incidents as were within that
state. Therefore, state Y could enter a divorce decree which would
prevent H's remarrying in that state, but it couldn't enter a decree
that would affect the legal incidents of the marriage which remained
with W in state X, such as her right to dower in her husband's
property. The discussion that follows supports this solution; and fol-
lows a discussion of another angle of the same problem by Elwood
Rosenbaum.t
In Haddock v. Haddock,2 the facts were similar to the facts of our
hypothetical case. Mr. and Mrs. Haddock were married in New York
and lived there until Mr. Haddock left and went to Connecticut where
he established a domicile and obtained a divorce from Mrs. Haddock,
having served her by puabication. Later, Mrs. Haddock instituted a
divorce action in New York, having personal service on Mr. Haddock
* This note is a companion note to the one immediately preceding,
and deals with the second solution of the problem as stated, supra,
p. 248.
'201 U.S. 562 (1905).
t See note supra at p. 247.2 Supra n. 1.
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in New York. Mr. Haddock set up the Connecticut decree as a defense.
On appeal the Supreme Court held that New York was not bound to
extend full faith and credit to the Connecticut decree, and that the
New York decree was valid.
To be able to reach the position taken in this discussion it must
first be agreed that divorces are in rem actions and the marital status
is the res.3
From this beginning we go to the fact that the party in fault in the
separation can't take the entire matrimonial domicile with him and
that the wife is entitled to set up a separate domicile.4 This of course
differs from the common law rule thnt the husband tooK the matrimonial
domicile with him, that the wife had no control of it at all, and that
the matrimonial domicile always had its situs at the domicile of the
husband. The new result is logical n that it prevents a p~rty in tha
wrong from -thus benefiting himself.
Now we have H in state Y acquiring domicile there; there is no
denial that he can acquire domicile there, the denial is that he can be
granted a divorce there that will destroy all of W's property rights in
the marital relation.
As we have seen, the marriage status is an in rem relation and
involves both parties to the suit; the husband, the party at fault, can't
take with him the marital status that belongs to the wife. The domicile
ef an innocent wife doesn't follow her husband, who deserts her and
runs into another state.5 H therefore can't have taken with him any
part of the marital status except that part peculiar to him. Thus the
Court of his new domicile, state Y, can't possibly have jurisdiction of
the res in any other part than it is possible for H to br'ng with him.
The innocent wife retains the part of the marital status peculiar
to her with her in state X, so that state Y can't, by a divorce granted to
H in state Y, affect the status of W in state X when it can't possibly
have any control over her part of the marital res. If the full faith and
credit clause can force state X to recognize the decree of state Y then
it follows that the court of State Y has disposed not only of a res
within its jurisdiction but also of a state X res.1
Should the court of the state granting the divorce have any more
rights as regards the marriage than the state where the other spouse Is
settled? Can we say that the state to which H removes has all the
rights as regards the separation of the parties? On grounds of comity
we could say that the relation shquld be reciprocal and that each state
has a right to control of the party within its jurisdiction.
3 Ditson v. Ditson, 4 R.I. 87 (1856); Andrews v. Andrews, 184 U.S.
14 (1903); Hughes v. Hughes, 211 Ky. 799 (1925).
49 Wall. 108 (1852).5Perkins v. Perkins, 225 Mass. 82 (1916). "The marriage status
for jurisdictional purposes in divorce proceedings remains in the state
of its origin, when the husband deserts a wife innocent of matrimonial
wrong in that state and goes into another state, where he establishes a
domicile."8Lister v. Lister, 86 N.J. Eq. 30 (1916).
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The decree of divorce in state Y affects H and allows him to remarry
and be free of W Number One residing in state X. He is entirely
divorced from her except in relation to her property rights in property
of her husband wherever situated.
The difficulties that such a result entails-that is, that the parties
are married in one state and not in another and that H would be in
adultery in any other state than Y-can be handled as stated by Profes-
sor Bingham:
"The legal ties as to the New York wife were mere technical
things supporting her claim to economic benefits only. The New
York marriage wasn't a going concern domestically; he no longer
lived with her. Socially, he had only one wife, the second; there
was no polygamy here in any socially condemnable sense. No legal
obligation on H to live with the first wife, nor does it imply that
If they should have lived together, adultery would not have been
committed."'
State X has the right to protect the property interests of its domicil-
iary, state Y has no right to completely destroy all wife Number
One's rights.
In suits, such as these, where the husband goes into another state,
we shall assume for further discussion that the parties were married
and lived together in California, and that the husband deserted her
and went to New York, and instituted the divorce proceedings. Many
problems arise as to the wife in California: (1) she can either go to the
trouble and expense of appearing generally in New York to answer, or
(2) attempt to appear specially for purpose of contesting jurisdiction.
But either of these involves great labor and expense on her part. Such
suits as these by the husband have not been allowed as working too
great a hardship and being too inequitable in regard to the wife.8
State X here should frame its own manner of recognition of the
decree of state Y. It should determine how far the divorce granted
by state Y should determine the marital status of its own resident.1 '
The "full faith and credit" clause isn't completely ignored in a
case of this kind; it may be argued that state Y didn't have jurisdic-
tion to render a divorce decree affecting the economic rights of a party
not personally within its jurisdiction. Nor can it be argued that state
Y should have the power to decree as to property in another state of a
party not within its jurisdiction.
The husband has an obligation to support his wife. It Is a per-
sonal legal tie between them which can't be completely dissolved by one
state that doesn't have jurisdiction of both spouses.
CONOLUSION
The result to be reached from the above discussion would be that
to prevent any injustice, the Court of state Z should inquire into the
121 Cornell L. Quart. 393 (1936).
'Kempson v. Kempson, 58 N.J. Eq. 94 (1899).
gToncray v. Toneray, 123 Tenn. 476 (1910).
2* Supra n. 6.
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matter of who was at fault in the separation and its holding as to W
Number one's dower right should depend on the result of the inquiry;
that is, if H is at fault the decree of divorce of state Y should not be
recognized and dower should go to W-1; but if W-1 was at fault in
causing the separation, then dower should go to W-2; for if W-1 is at
fault, then H can take the entire marital status into state Y with him,
state Y will thus have jurisdiction of the entire res, and there would be
no separation of the legal incidents of the marriage status.
NATMArN ETzaaOTT, 33.
